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of twentieth-century navies with the
same comprehensiveness.
JAMES GOLDRICK

Captain, Royal Australian Navy

Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 355pp. $32.95

In Most Secret and Confidential, Steven
Maffeo has written an exceptional study
of how intelligence was collected and
used during the French Revolutionary
Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
To limited degrees, the intelligence activities of the United States, Spain, Russia,
Denmark, and several other European
nations are described. More detail is provided concerning the excellent French intelligence efforts under Napoleon. The bulk
of the text, however, deals with the use of
intelligence by the British government,
especially the Admiralty, during the years
between 1793 and 1815.
Maffeo, who is a commander in a naval
reserve intelligence unit, has combined
his intelligence expertise with the skills
of an accomplished historian to write
this informative and most enjoyable
history of British intelligence efforts
during this period. His knowledge of
the history of intelligence operations is
excellent, and his grasp of the British
navy of this era is unsurpassed. He uses
not only primary sources (government
papers and personal letters) to document his work but also the books of such
novelists as C. S. Forester and Patrick
O’Brian to make his points.
The opening chapter describes how the
British government collected intelligence. It has been clear that Lloyd’s of
London, by means of its agents located
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around the world, was able to provide a
continuous flow of intelligence to the government, but it is fascinating to learn
that by virtue of opening diplomatic and
personal mail, the British Post Office
became the largest intelligence-gathering branch of the government.
Subsequent chapters treat other aspects of
the British intelligence effort. The Admiralty’s collection and use of intelligence is
discussed in depth, and so is the transmission of information. The difficulties are
shown of sending any type of message, especially when the usual form of communication at sea was signal flags, which were
useless at night or in limited visibility,
such as in battle. The subject of several
chapters is the commander as his own intelligence officer. Some commanders, such
as Nelson, were expert intelligence officers; others were not. However, all commanders had to sort through whatever
information was available to them and
make the best decisions they could—they
were literally on their own. Communications between detached fleets and the Admiralty often took weeks, if not months.
Commanders, therefore, without knowledge of the current government policy,
would ultimately decide on courses of action. The fact that they were fully supported by the Admiralty and the
government demonstrates the high level
of intelligence skills among the officers of
the Royal Navy.
The concluding chapters are case studies
that show what role intelligence, or the
lack thereof, played in three naval engagements. They are remarkable summations of the Indian Ocean action of Pulo
Aur in February 1804, the Copenhagen
expedition of December 1800–April
1801, and the Nile campaign of March
through August 1798. These three chapters form an excellent conclusion.
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This is a must read for every intelligence
officer, and for any member of the military who is interested in the history of intelligence. It should also be on the
reading list of every military and naval
historian, most history buffs, and fans of
naval fiction of this period. It
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substantiates that such fictional characters as Horatio Hornblower and Jack
Aubrey are soundly based on historical
fact, and that their activities, especially
concerning intelligence, are authentic.
MICHAEL RIGGLE

Naval War College
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